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A B S T R A C T   
DIY laboratories have the potential to advance new technologies, products and services through the leveraging of 
low-cost facilities by entrepreneurial individuals. We add to this emerging understanding of the DIY phenom-
enon by investigating the prevalence, operations and contextual factors that impact the use of DIY laboratories in 
the bicycle industry. We find two contexts in which DIY laboratories are utilised to develop component-level 
innovations: first, DIY laboratories are utilised as a low-cost way to enter an industry where the entrepreneur 
lacks the necessary financial resources and rely upon bootstrapping to build their enterprise. Second, and more 
frequently, DIY laboratories were used for the integration of diversified technical knowledge originating in other 
industries. Our study highlights the important role that DIY laboratories may play in leveraging inter-industry 
knowledge spillovers whereby DIY laboratories operate as incubators in the repurposing of diversified knowl-
edge from high-technology sectors to lower-technology sectors to generate incremental innovation. Further, the 
modular product architecture of the bicycle helped facilitate the co-opting of technical knowledge prevalent in 
other industries by allowing entrepreneurs to focus their product development and subsequent commercialisa-
tion activities at the component level of the product artefact.   
1. Introduction 
Technological innovation has long been linked to firm performance 
and economic growth (Andersson et al., 2018; Klarin, 2019; Li et al., 
2020; Tian et al., 2018). How this innovation occurs has been the 
subject of different models such as technology-push versus market-pull 
(Arthur, 2009) along with considerable analysis of the processes and 
the actors involved leading to different foci over time ranging from 
alliances and inter-organisational networks to open innovation, and the 
study of institutional factors (Christofi et al., 2019; Nylund et al., 2020;  
Rice et al., 2012). In adding to this burgeoning literature, DIY labora-
tories (hereafter referred to as ‘DIY labs’) have recently emerged as a 
new and rapidly-growing phenomenon that may expand the pace and 
scope of technological advancement (Gorman, 2011; Hecker et al., 
2018). The emergence of the DIY phenomenon is at least partially 
fuelled by technological advances such as increased computing power 
and other affordable technologies that allow research and development 
to be undertaken in small-scale locations such as garages and work-
shops, rather than traditional corporate or state-sponsored research 
environments (Nascimento et al., 2014). 
Much of the existing DIY labs literature has emphasised the moti-
vations, characteristics, background, and expertise of individual en-
trepreneurs, hobbyists, engineers and designers (Baden et al., 2015;  
Hatch, 2013; Martin, 2015). However, existing literature has largely 
disregarded the shape and influence of the technological and institu-
tional contexts in which DIY labs may emerge and prosper. Perhaps one 
possible explanation for this focus is that the DIY labs phenomenon has 
not yet attracted widespread interest in the management and organi-
sation literature, despite considerable attention in scientific and en-
gineering journals (Fox, 2013; Howard et al., 2019; von Briel et al., 
2018). Given the infancy of the research field from a management 
perspective, when and how DIY labs emerge in a particular institutional 
context, the role that they play as potential innovation incubators, and 
how the technological and institutional conditions determine what 
types of innovation are developed represent significant gaps in the 
extant literature. We thus seek to advance scholarship in this domain by 
addressing how DIY labs are utilised and the key contextual factors that 
impact their role in supporting the development of product innovation. 
To signpost our contribution, we draw upon the knowledge spillover 
theory of entrepreneurship (e.g., Acs, 2010; Acs et al., 2013;  
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Agarwal et al., 2010; Plummer and Acs, 2014) to examine the emer-
gence and utilisation of DIY labs by entrepreneurs in the global bicycle 
industry. As knowledge spillovers address the non-purposeful move-
ment of knowledge across organisational boundaries through means 
such as the loss of key personnel, reverse engineering of products and 
even corporate espionage (Shu et al., 2014), DIY labs may be utilised in 
the leveraging of knowledge spillovers from incumbent organisations to 
new start-ups. Critically, these DIY operations may play an ‘incubator’ 
role that facilitate the development of future organisational or industry 
spin-offs, and stimulate new products or processes (Chen and 
Choi, 2004). As such, our analysis seeks to illuminate the inter-industry 
knowledge spillover role that DIY labs play in repurposing knowledge 
from high-technology sectors and driving forward innovation in a re-
cipient sector. As part of this investigation, we considered the outputs 
of these DIY labs in terms of the types of innovations generated and the 
role of technological and contextual factors (e.g., product architecture) 
in allowing DIY labs to provide an effective entry point for new entrants 
to deliver exaptive innovations into the bicycle industry. 
2. Literature 
DIY labs are a new and rapidly-growing phenomenon with ex-
panding legitimacy having featured in both science/engineering as well 
as business research (Fox, 2014; Hecker et al., 2018; Kwon and 
Lee, 2017; Sarpong et al., 2020). DIY science is broadly defined as the 
process whereby individuals and groups out of their own need, curiosity 
or interest, innovatively develop, recreate or fix objects and systems 
from their own spaces and share the outcomes in different ways 
(Ferretti, 2019; Nascimento et al., 2014). Gorman (2011) highlights 
that the process involves scientists and developers conducting research 
and product development from homes and other non-traditional ve-
nues. However, the DIY organising logic may apply to corporate set-
tings where employees are provided access to open laboratories that 
allow interaction with enthusiasts from outside of the organisation to 
help generate new solutions to existing problems (Fritzsche, 2018). One 
of the challenges in clearly defining DIY labs is the heterogeneity of 
definitions and the way that it is viewed in practice across different 
contexts. It has been variously applied to different actors ranging from 
individuals, small groups of tech enthusiasts or entrepreneurs, to large 
online or physical communities, and activities that span a number of 
different disciplines such as engineering, science, and education – each 
with their own unique characteristics (Aldrich, 2014; Ferretti, 2019;  
Landrain et al., 2013). 
Much of the DIY innovation literature focuses on individual en-
trepreneurs, hobbyists, engineers and designers in respect of how they 
innovate and create new products (Baden et al., 2015; Hatch, 2013;  
Martin, 2015). Driven by intrinsic motivations such as the passion and 
enjoyment of the entrepreneur (Gerschenfeld, 2008; Hurst and 
Tobias, 2011; Kalil, 2013), the growth in DIY labs can be at least par-
tially explained by the increasing affordability of technical equipment 
that may be used. The development activities typically take place in 
non-traditional locations ranging from home garages to communal 
workshops, and whilst a variety of locations and facilities are provided 
in various examples in the literature, the key feature would seem to be 
that the research and development opportunities present in such loca-
tions differ considerably from corporate or state funded laboratories at 
universities or other research institutions that have a defined research 
programme (Nascimento et al., 2014). Similarly, funding tends to be 
drawn from outside the traditional funding channels, such as self- 
funding, crowdfunding, non-profit organisations or communal sponsors 
(Aldrich, 2014; Schön et al., 2014). 
Overall, the technological or institutional factors that encourage the 
emergence of the DIY labs phenomenon has been surprisingly dis-
regarded in the existing literature, albeit with a few notable exceptions. 
For instance, DIY labs are often associated with radical or breakthrough 
innovations (e.g., Aldrich, 2014; Anderson, 2012; Von Hippel 2005). 
Such radical innovations emerging from DIY labs contribute to the 
emergence of new sub-industries, as shown in cases concerning medical 
devices, extreme sports gear and typesetting industries (Aldrich, 2014;  
Gorman, 2011; Nascimento et al., 2014). At the institutional level of 
analysis, Fu and Lin (2014) noted how the shift to platforms in a 
number of industries has allowed for individuals to engage in ‘partici-
patory research’ which in turn has contributed to successful en-
trepreneurial start-ups such as Pebble, Makerbot, and Square in Silicon 
Valley. Likewise, Kwon and Lee (2017) acknowledge that technological 
and institutional changes have substantially reduced the barriers for 
entrepreneurs to engage in start-ups through DIY labs across many in-
dustries and that changes in traditional industry structures may provide 
increased opportunities for radical innovations by these entrepreneurs 
(Sarpong and Rawal, 2020). These opportunities are reinforced via the 
availability of new technologies that can operate in DIY spaces, en-
abling entrepreneurs to set up their businesses with far fewer resources 
(Hatch, 2013; Schön et al., 2014). This democratisation of scientific 
investigation, innovation and new product development through DIY 
labs represents a “cultural trend that focuses on an individual's ability 
to be a creator of things using technology” (Kwon and Lee, 2017: 318). 
Whilst DIY labs research to date has tended to address the ‘who’ and 
‘where’ questions, we turn to the knowledge spillover theory of en-
trepreneurship to illuminate ‘how’ knowledge and capability spillovers 
across both firms and industries to enable individuals to become a 
‘creator of things’ (Acs et al., 2013; Ghio et al., 2015; Plummer and 
Acs, 2014; Venturini et al., 2019). The theory posits that knowledge 
produced in a given technological context remains within that same 
context, reinforcing the existing technological trajectory and con-
straining technological variety (Battke et al., 2016; Schoenmakers and 
Duysters, 2010), leading incumbent firms to focus on only the familiar 
technological landscape (Aharonson and Schilling, 2016). The trans-
mission of knowledge spillovers are “informal, unintentional and un-
compensated transfers of knowledge” (Isaksson et al., 2016: 700) that 
occur when the technology or scientific knowledge developed by an 
incumbent firm is appropriated by a third party, often a new venture or 
start-up, without proper economic compensation (Acs et al., 2009;  
Chen and Choi, 2004; Kafouros and Buckley, 2008). It is this shift in the 
potential use of the knowledge outside of its existing technological 
domain that presents opportunities for radical or discontinuous in-
novation (Acs et al., 2013). 
Spillovers may arise in horizontal contexts - when the incumbent 
and recipient firms operate in the same technological domain – or in 
vertical contexts – when the incumbent and recipient firms operate in 
different technological domains (Kaiser, 2002; Montoro-Sánchez et al., 
2011; Stephan et al., 2019). In either case, knowledge spillovers occur 
when the knowledge created by the incumbent firm is not fully ap-
propriated or commercialised, and leaks to another organisation in 
various ways such as scientific publications, reverse technological en-
gineering, inter-firm collaborations, or through the loss of valuable 
human capital such as scientists and engineers leaving their existing 
organisations to pursue new opportunities (Shu et al., 2104). It is these 
“opportunities stemming from knowledge generated and not commer-
cially exploited by incumbent firms or academic research institutions” 
that may then be developed by entrepreneurs (Ghio et al., 2015: 2). 
These opportunities may often constitute exaptive innovations – the 
process by which technologies developed for one purpose are re-
purposed for an entirely different role (Andriani et al., 2017). 
In leveraging knowledge and technology spillovers, entrepreneurs 
may find DIY labs are able to play an ‘incubator’ role that facilitates the 
development of future organisational or industry spin-offs, and stimu-
lates new products or processes (Chen and Choi, 2004). Rather than 
conceptualising knowledge spillovers as lost opportunities for incum-
bent firms, it is possible to focus instead on the transformation of 
knowledge into innovation as the challenge facing most organisations, 
thereby recognising that firms will not be able to exploit all opportu-
nities that their knowledge base provides them into commercialised 
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innovations (Block et al., 2013). It is these uncommercialized oppor-
tunities that potentially provide the ‘intellectual fodder’ for DIY labs to 
act as an incubator for the development of small, entrepreneurial and 
often, high-technology firms (Chen and Choi, 2004; Montoro- 
Sanchez et al., 2011). 
Whilst all firms may have a portfolio of non-commercialised 
knowledge that has not been translated into innovations, it has been 
shown that the higher the level of R&D activities in a sector, the more 
knowledge is produced, and the greater the level of knowledge which 
remains unexplored and could potentially be exploited by new en-
trepreneurial ventures (Acs et al., 2013). Knowledge created through 
R&D and the subsequent innovations originating in sectors such as 
metals, aerospace, and chemicals are thus often described as hubs or 
‘superspreaders’ (Semitiel-Garcia and Noguera-Mendez, 2012) from 
which knowledge more-readily diffuses to other industries to spur 
technological advances in a recipient sector. In respect of knowledge 
spillovers, much research has relied upon quantitative measures such as 
patents, suggesting that high technology sectors (that tend to utilise 
patents) tend to be key drivers (Berg et al., 2019; Suh and Jeon, 2019). 
However, while some knowledge may be codified (which may be cap-
tured in patent counts etc.), other knowledge is tacit in nature (which 
may be better observed in processes or routines). Thus, industries that 
do not feature easily measurable explicit knowledge may be under-re-
presented in their impact on the number of new start-ups due to the 
difficulty in capturing the more tacit forms of knowledge that may 
spillover into entrepreneurial start-ups (Audretsch and 
Lehmann, 2005). In the context of DIY labs, we presently know rela-
tively little about the types of organisations from which knowledge 
spillovers emanate, the processes that facilitate inter-industry knowl-
edge spillover from source to recipient industries, and how technolo-
gical and institutional contexts shape the leveraging of such spillovers. 
This leads us to propose two research questions:   
RQ1: What role do DIY labs play in inter-industry technology and 
knowledge spillover?   
RQ2: How does the technological and institutional context affect the 
type of innovations that emerge? 
3. Research method 
The data used in this paper comes from a study of the global bicycle 
industry covering significant innovations that have emerged across the 
industry between the late 1970s and 2010. The global bicycle industry 
features very high levels of innovation at the product level and in re-
spect of many of the processes used in the development of components. 
The driver of this innovation often tends to be performance-related 
rather than cost minimisation. As an industry that services a competi-
tive sport in which small improvements can represent the difference 
between winning and losing, there is a constant demand from the very 
high end of the market for innovative components that drive perfor-
mance outcomes. Over time, many of these innovations diffuse through 
the industry to the mass-market (Yan and Hu, 2008). 
The industry is dominated by relatively small specialised firms, 
often entering the industry on the basis of a single innovative product 
(Isely and Roelofs, 2004), and as such, this is an industry where the use 
of DIY labs for some innovation activities may prosper, given the spe-
cialization of many firms and the absence of consolidation in the in-
dustry. The potential for DIY labs is extenuated by the fact that while 
there is a high demand for innovative products from the retail market, 
the financial resources and R&D of most specialised firms is limited and 
therefore, reliance upon knowledge spillovers and technology appro-
priation from more R&D intensive industries is possible. 
The data for this study was collected through an ‘analytically- 
structured history’ (Rowlinson et al., 2014) of the global bicycle in-
dustry with data being collected from archival sources in two separate 
tranches. A database was initially created covering all identified 
product innovations in the industry from approximately 1980 to 2010.1 
Following an extensive search, the database included trade publica-
tions, industry magazines (servicing industry participants and con-
sumers) and books about the industry. A full list of the different pub-
lications used is provided in Appendix 1. This list of innovations was 
then sent to two industry participants with a deep knowledge of the 
industry to check that no significant innovations had been missed. This 
first stage resulted in a total of 203 innovations. 
In the second stage of the data collection process, mini-case studies 
were developed for each innovation – who was involved, how was the 
innovation developed, where was it developed and who was involved in 
the commercialisation process. The database was supplemented by 
drawing upon company websites, bicycle history websites, books, 
newspaper articles and where necessary, interviews with people in the 
industry. A total of nine short interviews were conducted. These sup-
plemented the archival data, but also provided a useful checking me-
chanism that helped gauge the accuracy of key archival sources 
(King and Horrocks, 2010). Detailed information about the innovation 
and its genesis was available for 98 innovations – which became the 
final sample. 
Within the original list of 203 innovations, there were numerous 
examples of knowledge spillovers from different industries when people 
left large corporate firms and set up a firm producing bicycle compo-
nents. However, for 105 of these innovations we were unable to collect 
significant evidence about their development. For example, we found 
examples of where a major aircraft development schedule ended (eg the 
Boeing 777), large numbers of skilled engineers and machinists were let 
go. These people had experience with alternative materials (eg, carbon 
fibre, titanium, billet aluminium), many understood principles around 
wind resistance, drag, lift, etc. and some entered the bicycle industry 
producing specialty components. However, the data was limited on 
where and how the innovation occurred, and we have omitted these 
cases from our study. 
The 98 case studies for which detailed information was able to be 
sourced were then analysed along three different dimensions. The first 
was to assess the use of DIY labs. In making this determination, we used 
the following criteria:  
(a) The location of the work leading to the innovation was at the home 
of at least one of the innovators such as a garage, basement, home 
workshop etc., or  
(b) The location was a workshop away from home, and the enterprise 
was run by a single person or a family to serve an unrelated in-
dustry. Any ‘tinkering’ or experimentation thus occurs outside of 
their regular activities such as nights and weekends. 
By applying these criteria, we identified 15 innovations that could 
be determined as a DIY lab innovation. In comparison, the other 83 
innovations in our sample were developed through traditional corpo-
rate innovation efforts. 
Next, we considered the ‘source’ of the innovation in terms of who 
was involved, their background, their prior involvement in the bicycle 
industry and how they were able to turn the initial idea into reality 
1 A start date of 1980 was chosen as this saw the resurgence in interest outside 
of Western Europe in bicycle racing as a sport (both for spectators and for 
participants who may ride in groups using basic race-level bicycles). For ex-
ample, interest in the USA grew after Greg LeMond won the World 
Championship road race in 1983 and was the first American to win the Tour de 
France in 1986. Mountain biking also emerged in the late 1970s in the hills 
around San Francisco. These two trends saw a massive growth in the rate of 
innovation and change across the bicycle from a product that had barely 
changed over the previous 20 years. The end date of 2010 was chosen as col-
lecting data after this date became difficult due to the time lags in publishing 
relevant information in various materials such as books and hardcopy trade 
catalogues. 
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(including the physical location of key activities). Finally, each in-
novation was assessed in terms of the type of innovation that was de-
veloped using the Henderson and Clark (1990) typology to allow us to 
appreciate the prevalence of radical innovations, relative to incre-
mental, modular and architectural innovations. All of the 15 innova-
tions developed through DIY labs were classified as incremental. 
Historical research has an important role to play “for investigating 
the context of contemporary phenomena … identifying sources of 
exogenous variations, developing and testing more informed causal 
inferences and theories …” (Argyres et al., 2019: 2). While historically 
oriented research is often reliant upon primary data, there are examples 
where published secondary/archival sources have formed the principal 
source of data including case studies concerning the development of the 
turbojet (Carignani et al., 2019) and the development of the atomic 
bomb via the Manhattan Project (Gillier and Lenfle, 2019). Whilst in-
terviews are commonly used in historical research, they are invariably 
constrained by subjectivity such as respondent's own involvement in 
events and the contextual interpretation that this brings. As such, the 
benefit of archival sources for this research are threefold; (i) they 
provide opportunities to review innovations that were never very suc-
cessful and would most likely be forgotten in a retrospective review of 
innovations across the industry covering the past two decades or more, 
(ii) the archival sources provide interpretations of events at the time 
and reduce the likelihood of certain events being retrospectively ra-
tionalised or even ignored given subsequent events, and (iii) the ar-
chival sources provide the context of the period. 
In the Findings to follow, the data is presented in ‘blocks’ discussing 
innovations concerning different components in the bicycle. Different 
components draw upon different types of materials for production, 
different production processes and feature different firms. For example, 
frame innovations tend to rely largely upon new materials and different 
designs. In comparison, moving part components (e.g. gears and 
brakes) tend to be driven by larger firms and are primarily driven by 
greater precision, weight considerations and longer lasting sub-com-
ponents such as sealed bearings. Presenting the data this way is de-
signed to highlight the differences in innovation processes that are 
present across the dataset. The findings are thus presented under the 
categories of ‘hubs and wheels’, ‘frames’, ‘moving components’ and 
‘other’ such as saddles, handlebars, seat-posts etc. 
4. Findings 
4.1. Industry background 
Following a period of industry decline that coincided with the 
growth of the motor vehicle in the early 20th Century, the industry 
began to grow again in the 1960s, and by the 1980s it had regained 
much of its popularity (Beeley, 1992). The sport of bicycle racing 
started being televised outside of Europe and ‘middle-aged-men’ took to 
the sport in increasing numbers as a social form of exercise 
(Petty, 1995). With this growth, smaller specialised firms started to 
develop a range of components to sell to frame-manufacturers. These 
components needed to be able to ‘mix and match’ with as many frame- 
manufacturers as possible and so the industry started to shift towards a 
range of industry standards to connect components together 
(Dowell, 2006). These industry standards eventually reduced over time, 
and today the bicycle has a modular architecture with components 
linked together via a limited number of widely-dispersed industry 
standards (Galvin, 1999; Galvin and Morkel, 2001). There has been a 
limited movement back towards less modularity in some components 
such as the drive train in the case of Shimano (Fixson and Park, 2008). 
With no single firm able to produce an entire bicycle, the industry is 
populated by specialised firms that are spread across a wide range of 
countries. While the production of components for performance-related 
components is dominated by firms in Western Europe, Japan, USA and 
Taiwan, there are manufacturers in other regions such as South 
America, Oceania and Eastern Europe, along with a very considerable 
number of value-based producers through China and other parts of 
Asia. 
4.2. Hubs and wheels 
Many innovations concerning hubs and wheels were developed by 
incumbent firms in the industry using traditional R&D processes. New 
materials such as titanium and carbon fibre in the hubs often emerged 
from firms with significant experience and competencies in this area. 
Many of the firms operating in the hub and wheel components were 
very small and highly specialised, and a number entered the bicycle 
industry on the basis of incremental innovations. Despite the promi-
nence of corporate R&D relating to this component type, we found 
examples of DIY lab activity. 
Leight Saergent moved from Australia to undertake further study in 
England and was subsequently employed in the Williams Formula One 
team. He then moved to Indiana with an Indy car racing team, but after 
the team folded, he set-up a small workshop facility doing Indy car 
body repair work and building nose boxes and wings for race cars. He 
initially looked at using his technical knowledge relating to carbon fibre 
construction to build a racing wheelchair, but after a race car client, 
who was also a keen cyclist, showed him a disc wheel, he moved to 
designing a carbon fibre disc wheel. Commercialising the product under 
the name of Zipp, today the company is one of the largest firms pro-
ducing carbon fibre discs and other aerodynamic wheels. 
The other key innovator in disc wheels was Steve Hed. Initially he 
developed products for the skateboard and water-ski industries (where 
he worked with fibreglass and started to experiment with carbon fibre), 
before his interest in cycling saw him open a bike shop. The develop-
ment of the disc wheel occurred in his garage and was used initially in 
professional Ironman races by his future wife, Anne Hed. Together they 
used the prize winnings from one race to secure a loan of $14,000, 
which allowed them to move beyond the prototype Anne was using and 
started commercial production of carbon fibre disc wheels under the 
brand name of HED. 
Phil Wood was the developer of the sealed bearing used in just 
about all hubs today except the very cheapest end of the market, though 
he never patented the idea and never became rich. After a stint in the 
US Navy, he enrolled in the California Institute of Technology, but 
dropped out and went to work as a mechanical engineer for FMC. 
Tinkering with hubs on weekends after racing at the local velodrome 
led him to develop a sealed bearing hub in his home workshop. 
Expecting to sell a maximum of 50 hubs per year via people he knew, 
Wood did not transition to the bicycle industry full-time until he felt 
assured that the product would be successful. 
4.3. Frames 
Traditionally bicycle frames have been made from steel and in-
novation tends to occur in terms of the design, such as different angles 
and the types of tubing used. For example, (what became) Rock Lobster 
bicycles are event-specific in terms of design (ie different track cycling 
events, different events on the road). The founder of Rock Lobster, Paul 
Sadoff, started working for a local bike shop whilst competing. He then 
started building frames out of the garage of a property where he was 
renting a room. He continued to operate out of different garages as he 
moved around, including that of his then girlfriend before she kicked 
him out after two years. After a stint in a concrete outbuilding on a 
ranch, he applied for a business license, a full ten years after his first 
frame was produced and quit his other work to focus entirely upon 
frame-building under the name of Rock Lobster which has subsequently 
produced frames for Olympic and world championship teams. 
One company has been particularly successful at designing products 
for women – recognising the physiological differences between men 
and women. Georgena Terry completed a liberal arts undergraduate 
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degree and then an MBA before returning to university studies to 
complete a degree in mechanical engineering. Working initially at 
Westinghouse Electric and then Xerox, Terry had simultaneously taken 
on a hobby of building bicycles for friends out of her basement. After 
two years with Xerox, she left the company to found Terry Bicycles 
which produced bicycles that accounted for male-female differences 
(such as leg length as a proportion of total height). Her company sub-
sequently developed a range of female specific products such as saddles 
and cycle clothing. 
In terms of alternative materials, titanium has been used extensively 
in weight-bearing components (including frames) to improve strength 
and decrease weight. Litespeed was one of two innovators in respect of 
titanium frames. Its history can be traced to the small Lynskey family 
run machine shop in Tennessee. One of the sons suffered from a running 
injury and was advised to take up cycling. Unimpressed with the bikes 
for sale in the local bike shop, the three brothers ‘tinkered’ around on 
weekends in their machine shop trying out different frame options. 
They ended up using some leftover titanium tubes from a chemical job 
and a basic titanium frame prototype was constructed. While the local 
bike shops were not impressed, they took their new frame to a trade 
show in California and started producing some frames under the brand 
of Litespeed as orders started coming in. 
Interestingly, present at the same tradeshow in California was an-
other embryonic titanium frame developer – Merlin Metalworks. 
Started by Gwyn Jones, Gary Helfrich, and Mike Augspurger in 
Massachusetts, Helfrich was at the time working for Fat Chance Cycles 
where he had put forward the concept of a titanium frame. Getting 
nowhere, he teamed up with known-frame designer, Auspurger, with 
Jones’ contribution being the sourcing of titanium tubing from the 
aerospace industry given his background. Auspurger left the partner-
ship early, but Helfrich continued to drive operations out of the base-
ment of his house to create Merlin Metalworks’ first titanium frame. 
Titanium wasn't the only new material being used for frame pro-
duction. While aluminium is not as strong as steel, doubling the dia-
meter of the tubing will result in a 16-fold increase in strength. The first 
oversized aluminium tubed frame was developed under the name of Hi- 
E Engineering in Tennessee. Harlen Meyer was an aircraft engineer and 
used this background in working with aluminium and tungsten inert gas 
(TIG) welding to develop a bicycle for his son who was a competitive 
cyclist. Only 15 frames were produced in his home workshop, but it 
created a foundation for future aluminium frames (and other alumi-
nium components). 
In comparison to some of the basement/garage/personal workshop 
developed frames, the development of carbon fibre bicycle frames re-
lied upon more corporate development facilities. For example, the first 
monocoque frame (single piece carbon fibre construction) came from 
Kestrel. Started by ex-employees of Trek and specialists from the 
aerospace industry, the scale and complexity of carbon fibre production 
was beyond what could be undertaken in a garage or small-scale 
workshop that did not have corporate backing. Similarly, other less 
common exotic materials required a corporate setting. Kirk Precision in 
the UK developed a magnesium bicycle frame. Frank Kirk, an auto-
motive engineer, left Ford to create a small range of performance-or-
iented bicycles using the die cast method to create the magnesium 
structure. The beryllium frame was created by integrated beryllium 
company Brush-Wellman under the brand name of American Bicycle 
Manufacturer. Further, a unique product by Ballau Structures used an 
exceptionally thin-walled titanium frame where the rigidity was pro-
vided through the same honeycomb material used in the B2 Stealth 
Bomber. Like much of the complex carbon fibre frames that used pro-
duction techniques such as bladder moulding and CNC machining to cut 
the pre-peg carbon sheets for joins, the cost and complexity of some 
exotic material frames required significant funding precluding their 
development in a DIY lab setting. 
4.4. Moving components 
The moving components on a bicycle centre on the gears and the 
brakes. They include the brake levers, the callipers (or other braking 
structures such as a drum or disc system) and brake pads, chain rings, 
chain, cranks, bottom bracket, rear cassette (gear cogs), front and rear 
derailleur, and the gear levers. Known amongst cyclists as a component 
set, the production of these moving components has been dominated by 
large international firms such as Shimano, Campagnolo, Mavic, Sachs 
and Suntour. Consolidation and closures of some of the smaller players 
(eg Suntour and Gallo) through the 1980s and into the 1990s saw 
Shimano at one stage control over 80% of the market. As the moving 
components are expensive, relative to the total cost of a bicycle, these 
large firms have undertaken their R&D internally. 
In the last decade, the major change has been the growth of SRAM. 
The original innovation that spawned the success of SRAM was the 
Gripshift gear changer that was designed and prototyped by engineer 
Sam Patterson. Working for a San Diego engine manufacturer, Patterson 
was keen to develop a gear changing system for mountain bikes that did 
not require the rider to remove their hands from the handlebars. As 
such, outside of work, Patterson designed a gear shifting system that 
wrapped around the handlebars and was indexed so that a single click 
on the system would shift one gear up or down according to the di-
rection it was turned. Patterson then met Stanley Day on a ski trip via 
his brother who had attended graduate school with Day. Intrigued by 
this untested design that Patterson had put together, Day organised a 
group of investors to bring the idea to fruition, creating the basis for 
what is now SRAM. 
4.5. Other components 
John Rader, the developer of what was to become known as the 
Aheadset, came to the industry with a background in the race car in-
dustry (as did numerous members of the family). His family had its own 
workshop where they could work on their cars at home in Texas and it 
was here that Rader developed a radically different headset (joining the 
stem and handlebars to the front forks to allow for steering). He later 
pitched the idea to Peter Gilbert of Dia-Compe (which took on the idea 
to manufacture the product under the Dia-Compe brand). 
The other innovative headset was developed by Chris King. He had 
previously done some work at a local bikeshop and was encouraged to 
make a much lighter headset, but after college he went to work for a 
medical instrument company that made air tools for surgeries. When 
products came back under warranty, he took these apart to extract the 
bearing sets. He managed to salvage about 200 sets that would other-
wise be discarded and then used these as the basis of building a new 
style of headset. His initial workshop would have been not much more 
than 20 square metres. Four years later, the need for expansion saw him 
rent a disused roller-skating rink and move into other bicycle compo-
nents including frames. 
Geoff Ringle also worked in the medical devices industry designing 
and fabricating new products (including holding a patent for a key 
component in a heart pump). A constant ‘tinkerer’, he operated from a 
small workshop out of hours developing stems and cranks until he made 
the shift into full-time bicycle component production, ending up de-
signing and handlebars, seat-posts, hubs and headsets. 
Ex-USA road and track racer Bill Shook started tinkering with 
components after his competitive cycling career ended. With a Masters 
in Mechanical Engineering, following some work in the pump industry, 
he initially developed a lightweight water-bottle cage from a single 
piece of aluminium. Other aluminium cages existed, but over time, they 
broke at the weld points. Experience in working with pipe where curves 
are often superior to welded angles saw Shook take an alternative path 
that avoiding welding. He subsequently developed an adjustable seat- 
post (again on the basis of his experience with tubular pipe) in his small 
workshop. These products were then released for commercial sale 
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under the brand of American Classic and the operation eventually 
shifted to larger commercial premises where further components such 
as hubs were developed. 
Finally, in the area of pedals, ski equipment manufacturer, Look, 
introduced a ‘clipless’ design (i.e. no cage over the top of the foot) that 
has been adapted by all major pedal manufacturers. One of the more 
innovative designs has been the Speedplay pedal which allows a degree 
of rotation on the pedal without becoming unattached. The story be-
hind this innovation was that Richard Bryne was invited by mechanical 
engineer Steve Ball to be the rider for a specific competition for which 
Ball was developing a new design. The two of them started working out 
of Ball's garage on innovative designs for different frame designs and 
specific components. As part of this ‘apprenticeship’, Bryne learnt to 
mill and lathe billet aluminium. Bryne's regular day job changed over 
time from promoter to setting up a fencing company, but he kept 
coming back to bicycle components. Working with Ball, Bryne devel-
oped and patented what is now the Speedplay pedal design. However, 
after 22 rejections from potential manufacturers and 2 years after being 
granted a patent, Bryne and his wife established Speedplay and started 
to manufacture the component themselves. 
5. Discussion 
Our findings have highlighted that the bicycle industry has bene-
fitted from numerous innovations across virtually all components in the 
product architecture, and DIY labs played an important, but albeit 
limited, role in this technological advancement as these innovations 
often drew upon technical knowledge that originated in other ‘super-
spreader’ sectors. While the 15 innovations we identified are not a large 
proportion of the total innovations, our case analysis nonetheless illu-
minates how the fundamental principles of DIY labs - placing research 
and development activities in hands of individuals outside of a corpo-
rate setting - does occur in the bicycle industry and has an impact upon 
its technical trajectory. 
Our findings allow us to make three important contributions that re- 
affirm and extend existing scholarship on DIY lab entrepreneurship. 
First, turning to our first research question - what role do DIY labs play 
in inter-industry technology and knowledge spillover? – we highlighted 
two ways in which DIY labs contributed to the technological advance of 
the bicycle industry. The first group of innovations (a total of 5) were 
developed intra-industry by individuals who were bicycle industry en-
thusiasts and already located in the industry, but lacked the financial 
resources to establish a well-funded and formal enterprise. For example, 
Terry studied mechanical engineering and worked as an engineer for 
large industrial conglomerates, and it was her engineering background 
and interest in the sector that actually put her in a position to make 
specialised bicycle frames for women. Working out of her basement 
kept cost low until she made the move to work full-time on this busi-
ness. These cases were good example of bricolage where the en-
trepreneur operates frugally and ‘makes do’ with their limited resources 
(Senyard et al., 2014; Michaelis et al., 2019) and aligns with much of 
the DIY lab literature that refers to the limited capital of many DIY 
ventures and the fact that they are often self- or crowd-funded 
(Alrich, 2014; Sarpong et al., 2020). 
Probably more interesting were the second group of 10 innovations 
- which were developed inter-industry as DIY innovators appropriated 
knowledge or technology from other high-technology industries and 
combined and applied it in new ways in the bicycle sector. For example, 
Meyer, who as an aircraft engineer was experienced at working with 
aluminium (the dominant construction material in respect of aircraft) 
and TIG welding, and was able to build the first aluminium bicycle 
frames in his home workshop. Taken together, these two approaches to 
the development of innovation highlights the importance of both intra- 
and inter-industry knowledge spillovers. 
Across our sample, we noted a number of examples of innovations 
arising from inter-industry knowledge spillovers originating in other 
high-technology sectors. In many cases, the DIY developers had ex-
tensive prior knowledge and experience in a variety of industries with 
the car racing and automotive sector being heavily represented. Often, 
these super-spreader industries featured large multi-national firms who 
engaged in many, if not all, segments of the industry value chain and 
across a number of different technologies. The motor vehicle industry, 
for example, relies upon a range of materials and different production 
processes and features high-levels of consolidation. The presence of 
super-spreader source industries is perhaps unsurprising as prior re-
search has suggested that innovations in the bicycle industry have 
drawn upon technology originating from the aerospace, chemical, 
motorcycle, automotive and defence industries (Meissner et al., 2020). 
Our findings also indicated that inter-industry knowledge spillovers 
featured the integration and application of diversified knowledge sets 
which emerged from a combination of different source technologies and 
needed to be integrated in new and novel ways (Battke et al., 2016). 
While the existing literature is somewhat inconclusive, diversified 
knowledge is central to novelty in the innovation process (e.g.,  
Arthur, 2009; Schilling and Green, 2011). In our case analysis, all of the 
innovations arising from inter-industry knowledge spillovers were de-
veloped by individuals who had extensive prior experience (normally as 
engineers) in other unrelated industries. Our findings show numerous 
examples of knowledge bases relevant to different technologies (in 
different industries) being adapted and combined with specialised bi-
cycle industry knowledge to create recombinant sets of knowledge that 
could then be applied to the recipient sector. 
Second, in our case analysis, DIY labs were predominantly focused 
on commercializing entrepreneurial opportunities rather than ex-
tending the underlying science. Whether it was working with existing 
carbon fibre strands and/or sheets to mould them into a disc wheel 
rather than a race car nose box, or collecting discarded bearing sets 
from medical equipment to be repurposed, the DIY labs focused on 
using existing knowledge from another sector, combining it with bi-
cycle industry knowledge, and applying it in new ways to create new 
business opportunities. Thus, the DIY labs became an experimental 
transition point between identifying a business opportunity and fina-
lising a business concept (Battke et al., 2016; Bhave, 1994). The ar-
chival sources we employed often used the terms ‘tinkering and ex-
perimentation’ as DIY developers experimented and re-experimented 
without facing the commercial constraints of a typical corporate set-
ting. The use of DIY labs as a space for experimentation and refinement 
rather than extending basic science perhaps makes sense given the 
limited capital base that existed. Fully-resourced R&D programs were 
simply not realistic given that these entrepreneurs were essentially 
engaged in boot-strapping (Ebben and Johnson, 2006). 
As the technologies relied upon by the DIY innovators were not 
proprietary or ‘cutting-edge’, their focus was on repurposing the 
knowledge for the bicycle industry context. The key role of the DIY lab 
was to allow the experimentation process to occur unfettered rather 
than facing the commercial constraints that are likely to present 
themselves in a corporate setting. The migration of human capital and 
knowledge across industry boundaries provided the basis for the busi-
ness opportunity, whilst the DIY laboratory presented a space for en-
trepreneurial activity to occur with few constraints to propel forward 
the eventual refinement of a business concept (Fig. 1) 
In comparing these 15 cases to the other 83 innovations in the 
sample where DIY labs did not feature in the innovation process, we 
identified three key themes. First, the innovation development process 
was considerably more structured. Many innovations emerged from 
specific research projects that built upon existing knowledge and thus 
created something of a technology trajectory. Interestingly, the later 
innovations that were developed by many of the firms discussed in the 
previous section followed this same path. For example, Zipp and HED 
continued to innovate in the area of carbon fibre aerodynamic com-
ponents (primarily wheels). These innovation efforts were far more 
defined, structured and funded compared to the ‘tinkering’ that was 
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often observed in respect of DIY labs. 
Second, the size and scope of the firms already operating in the 
industry meant that many firms produced multiple components, often 
utilising a variety of different technologies. Whilst the number of ra-
dical innovations were limited, the fact that these firms had the capa-
city to innovate across multiple components and thus alter the archi-
tecture of parts of the bicycle. For example, Shimano was able to alter 
gear levers, brakes levers and the derailleurs (front and rear) to develop 
an integrated gear changing system that operated within the brake lever 
system. Such an innovation was simply beyond the scope of possibility 
for the SMEs that utilised DIY labs and entered the industry on the basis 
of an innovation in a single component. And third, exaptation of 
technologies from other industries did not occur just through DIY labs. 
Firms with a background in other industries (eg Look from the ski in-
dustry, EDO Fibre Science from the defence industry) often took a 
technology developed in one industry and leveraged this into the bi-
cycle industry – sometimes through a new subsidiary. Thus, DIY labs 
were just one model for exaptation in the bicycle industry. 
Turning to our second research question - how does the technolo-
gical and institutional context affect the type of innovations that 
emerge? - our findings extend existing research on the nature of ex-
pative innovations – the process whereby technologies developed for 
one purpose are repurposed for an entirely different role 
(Andriani et al., 2017). To date, the exaptation literature is dominated 
by examples of firms co-opting a technology from one industry to an-
other – for example, the magnetron in radar being used to create the 
first microwave oven by Raytheon (Beltagui et al., 2020;  
Mastrogiorgio and Gilsing, 2016), Corning's specialised glass products 
being used as a basis for the creation of fibre optics (Cattani, 2005,  
2006) or Pfizer's Viagra initially being developed as an antihypertensive 
drug, but was subsequently found to be useful in respect of erectile 
dysfunction (Andriani et al., 2017). In comparison, the exaptive in-
novation developed for the bicycle industry was created in an organi-
sation separate from the original source. Thus, in our case analysis, the 
capacity for DIY lab innovators to leverage inter-industry knowledge 
spillovers to create exaptive innovations is, at least, partially a function 
of the technological environment (eg, product architecture) that sup-
ports knowledge spillovers across industry boundaries. 
While diversified knowledge has been linked to increased techno-
logical variety or novelty (van den Bergh, 2008; Schoenmakers and 
Duysters, 2010), the type of exaptive innovations that DIY labs com-
mercialised is surprisingly under-elaborated. However, our data allows 
us to advance an understanding of the types of innovation that DIY labs 
may engage in. By drawing upon Henderson and Clark (1990) in-
novation typology, our findings indicate that DIY labs engaged in in-
cremental exaptive innovation, rather than radical or architectural in-
novation, however this finding runs counter to some existing literature 
(Aldrich, 2014; Anderson, 2012; Kwon and Lee, 2017). As the bicycle is 
a modular product design, where each component is designed in-
dependently of each other and connects to the product architecture 
through a defined set of interfaces (Fixson and Park, 2008), the modular 
character of the bicycle encouraged new entrants to enter the industry 
by permitting innovation to be enveloped within a single modular 
component that could be developed in isolation from the rest of the 
industry (Burton and Galvin, 2018). In comparison, the design of less 
modular products such as an Apple iPhone make it difficult for firms to 
contribute components to the product system without more formalised 
links to the industry value chain (e.g. even app developers cannot re-
lease new apps unfettered via the App Store without Apple's approval). 
As such, modular product architectures not only enable innovation to 
be isolated within structures such as DIY labs, but the design also allows 
individuals or small enterprises to enter an industry by focusing upon a 
single component at a time, such as a water-bottle cage or seat-post 
which may be the starting point for a successful new enterprise. Thus, 
we suggest that DIY labs may be an important enterprise for modular 
exaptation (Andriani and Carignani, 2014) when the technology from 
one industry is able to be coopted into an industry due to the mod-
ularity of the product architecture. 
The issue of exaptation is often linked to the notion of serendipity 
(Dew, 2009; Meyers, 2007) and indeed in the cases discussed here, 
there may have been an element of serendipity involved – a lucky 
conflation of people, ideas and circumstances. The shift between in-
dustries for most of the innovations could be viewed as a matter of luck 
(versus foresight), but it is possible that this is when DIY labs are most 
useful – when people find themselves in a position to take advantage of 
a particular knowledge set that will allow them to enter a new industry, 
but lack the experience and connections in the new industry to raise 
capital and run the new venture in a more formalised form. This does 
not mean that DIY labs do not have an important role to play – even if 
serendipity was perhaps an important part of the innovation story. The 
innovations developed align with the continuing ‘foresight versus luck’ 
debate (Barney, 1997; Cattani, 2006) and while some degree of ser-
endipity may have been present, it was also clear that the DIY in-
novators were on the lookout for opportunities. For example, Saergent 
was planning to develop a race wheelchair; Chris King may have 
worked in the medical devices industry, but had an interest in bicycles 
from his days of racing and working in a bike shop. The innovation 
literature is full of examples of ‘luck’ (see Garud et al., 1997;  
Meyers, 2007), nonetheless we have found that DIY labs played an 
important role as incubators of new innovations that often evolved on 
the basis of knowledge acquired from other industries. 
5.1. Policy implications 
Given the role that DIY labs played in the development of incre-
mental innovations in the bicycle industry, there are potential policy 
implications for governments seeking to grow local industries. The DIY 
labs form an important transition point between the large integrated 
firms in high-technology sectors that undertook significant research and 
the eventual commercialisation in recipient sectors of some of the 
knowledge spillovers that originated in these large firms. As spaces for 
experimentation and commercialisation that adapted diversified 
knowledge from one industry and applied it to another industry, DIY 
labs may be a low cost, low risk approach for innovation generation and 
diffusion in a new industry. 
DIY labs were not responsible for radically transforming product 
architectures or industries, but they did contribute to economic growth 
in the immediate region. None of the examples we found in the bicycle 
Fig. 1. DIY labs as a central transition point between industries.  
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industry utilised large-scale DIY labs in the form that have been es-
tablished in some regions to support R&D in life sciences 
(Landrain et al., 2013; Wexler, 2017). Instead, our DIY innovators had 
to make do with garages, personal workshops and basements. Whilst 
this obviously did not hamper those that innovated and released a 
commercially successful product into the market, it is unknown whe-
ther there were missed opportunities due to a lack of appropriate de-
velopment space. Thus, in the same way that collaborative or co- 
working spaces have been successful in supporting entrepreneurial 
ventures (Bouncken and Reuschl, 2018; Fuzi, 2015), DIY labs could 
provide an important support mechanism for budding entrepreneurs. 
Bringing together a range of diversified knowledge bases from in-
tegrated firms into corporate or government-supported DIY labs may 
even go some way to moving past the incremental innovation that was 
observed in the bicycle industry, and instead help create the break- 
through and radical innovations that various authors suggest is possible 
(Aldrich, 2014; Kwon and Lee, 2017). 
6. Conclusions 
Existing DIY labs literature has to date tended to focus on the traits, 
motivations and background/expertise of entrepreneurs that utilise 
home, workshop or other non-traditional spaces to undertake research 
and development (Baden et al., 2015; Hatch, 2013; Martin, 2015). 
Suggesting that these DIY labs provide opportunities for the democra-
tisation of science (Kwon and Lee, 2017), they are often positioned as 
an opportunity to create breakthrough innovations that may address 
some of the major challenges that sit at the intersection of science and 
society (Hecker et al., 2018). Given the relative immaturity of the re-
search concerning DIY labs, the issues concerning their role in com-
mercializing knowledge spillovers and their role in linking those in-
dustries from which knowledge spillovers originate and the industries 
into which the new commercialised knowledge is leveraged has not, to 
date, been a focus of the research. 
Our study of the bicycle industry has identified a number of cases of 
DIY labs driving innovation. Contrary to expectations (see  
Aldrich, 2014), they did not produce radical or break-through innova-
tions, but rather produced a range of incremental innovations that re-
lied heavily upon the use of alternative materials or the potential for 
enhanced performance in respect of one or more components. A partial 
explanation for this may lie with modular design of the bicycle, perhaps 
making it unlikely for any but the largest firms to drive architectural or 
radical innovation (Fixson and Park, 2008; Burton and Galvin, 2020). 
However, what was also observed was that the DIY labs were primarily 
locations where experimentation could occur as entrepreneurs sought 
to convert diversified knowledge from other industries into new mar-
ketable products. The DIY lab provided the space for relatively open- 
ended investigation and tinkering outside of the corporate setting 
where a lack of clarity around the potential for a commercialised pro-
duct may have been challenging in a more formalised structure. They 
suffered from a lack of working capital which led them to focus more on 
the development part of ‘research and development’, but just as im-
portantly, the DIY labs provided spaces that were not subject to the 
types of expectations and focused research that would likely be found in 
more corporate settings. The knowledge that formed the basis for the 
innovations was general in nature and certainly not proprietary. En-
trepreneurs needed to experiment and tinker in a setting that would 
allow it to be applied in a new industry – something that had not been 
envisaged by the original developer in the source industry and it was in 
this setting that DIY labs proved valuable. Thus, DIY labs may not be 
the engine for growth in transforming industries that some may hope 
for. They are, however, an important part of the entrepreneurial land-
scape that play a significant role in pushing the technological frontier of 
existing modular products. 
In the case of the bicycle industry, the presence of DIY labs has 
fulfilled an important role in providing a flow of innovations into the 
industry. Paradoxically, the high level of demand for innovative pro-
ducts in the competition-oriented segment of the market has not driven 
a massive investment in R&D across the industry, largely due to the 
scale of this market segment. With knowledge spillovers occurring from 
the aerospace, chemical, skiing, motorcycle, motor vehicle and defence 
industries, there are challenges in translating this diversified knowledge 
from largely integrated firms into novel innovations. Often the ab-
sorptive capacity that allows firms to recognise the value of the 
knowledge does not exist, or perhaps due to its diversified nature it is 
hard to convert it into a product innovation without an entrepreneur 
with the appropriate background to commercialise the knowledge. DIY 
labs are therefore a transition point for knowledge spillovers, where 
diversified knowledge is commercialised as it moves from an integrated 
firm to a more specialised one that is later able to leverage this spe-
cialised knowledge for further developments in the same technology. 
It should be noted that the case histories of innovations in the global 
bicycle industry were not necessarily representative of all innovations 
that occurred across the time period considered. The innovations were 
almost entirely skewed towards the ‘performance’ segment of the 
market. However, prior research (Galvin, 1999; Yan and Hu, 2008) has 
indicated that innovative activity tends to occur in this segment before 
diffusing to other value-based segments across time. In addition, the 
archival materials accessed were only those that were available in 
English and they tended to focus upon the higher priced and more 
performance-oriented segments. Thus, the data is almost silent on any 
possible technical advances made by Taiwanese and Chinese firms that 
operate in the more price-sensitive market segments. As such, there are 
possibly product innovations by firms in the Far East that were not 
captured within this study. 
Looking forward, the positioning of DIY labs is an area that offers 
both theoretical and policy opportunities. While the bicycle industry 
did not see entrepreneurs use formalised DIY lab space that was sup-
ported by government or corporate backing, this is an emerging trend – 
especially in the life sciences (Landrain et al., 2013; Wexler, 2017) – 
and one that may support technological development, entrepreneurship 
and the economic opportunities that flow from innovation support. In 
the same way that collaborative spaces to support start-ups benefit the 
local economy, research on the role that more formalised DIY labs 
provide to effective commercialisation of diversified knowledge spil-
lovers is a worthy area of investigation. 
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Appendix 1. Data sources 
Trade publications 
Pedal Pushers Guide 
Bicycling Buyers Guide 
Colorado Cyclist Catalogue 
Cycling Buyers Guide 
Cycle Express Catalogue 
Cycling World Buyers Guide 
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Magazines for industry participants and sport enthusiasts 
Bicycling 
Bicycling Australia 
Bicycling World 
Cycling World 
Mountain Bike 
Mountain Bike Action 
Performance Cyclist 
Velo News 
Books 
Bicycle: The History 
Bicycle History: A Chronological Cycling History of People, Races and 
Technology 
A History of Bicycles: From Hobby Horse to Mountain Bike 
The Bicycle Book 
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